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Choosing the Speaker of the House of Commons: some
proposals for change
Should we change the way we select the Speaker of the House of Commons? The current system requires
that the House select an MP, who then gives up their party label and their public political views. At general
elections, Speakers’ seats are not contested by the main parties. Richard Berry and Sean Kippin argue that
this disenfranchises the voters of the Speaker ’s constituency, and show how the House of Commons could
modernise the way it chooses its presiding officer by adopting one of several alternative methods used abroad.
The Speaker of  the
House of  Commons
takes no party whip,
answers to no party
leader, and displays
an almost judicial
neutrality in the big
policy issues of  the
day. While most keen
f ollowers of  Brit ish
polit ics are aware of
this, what is slightly
less well known is
that by convention








general election. Ef f ectively, this means that voters in the Speaker ’s constituency are prevented f rom
participating f ully.
Though of ten presented as a long-standing component of  our constitutional settlement, absolute
compliance with this convention is a relatively new development. For example, Labour stood candidates
against ‘Conservative’ Speakers at three relatively recent general elections (both of  1974’s elections, and
again in 1987). The last two General Elections have seen Speakers f ace genuine polit ical opponents in the
f orm of  the Scottish Nationalists (in f ormer Speaker Michael Martin’s Glasgow North East constituency),
and UKIP (in the case of  John Bercow’s challenge by Nigel Farage in Buckingham). In both cases, there was
no Conservative, Labour or Liberal Democrat candidate when they each sought re-election as Speaker.
So while voters in the Speaker ’s seat do usually have the opportunity to opt f or an alternative candidate,
this opportunity is curtailed by the lack of  choice on of f er. Although this may allow previously scattered
opposition to be f ocused on the most viable alternative candidate, even voters who f eel strongly about the
current incumbent may f ind the available options unpalatable. Conservative voters wanting to oppose
Michael Martin, f or instance, would likely have baulked at the idea of  voting f or the SNP in 2005.
The lack of  main-party challenge may also open the door to polit ical opportunism. For instance, f ollowing
Martin’s resignation as part of  the expenses scandal in 2009, Parmjit Dhanda, the then Labour MP f or
Gloucester, stood f or Speaker in 2009, bef ore losing his seat to the Conservatives a year later. Had his bid
been successf ul, the voters of  Gloucester would have been deprived of  the opportunity to eject an MP
they were intending to replace. Nor is there any guarantee that the MP standing as Speaker in a general
election will remain in posit ion. There was an attempt by a small band of  Conservative backbenchers to
remove Bercow as Speaker due to personal and polit ical dif f erences. If  successf ul, this would have meant
not only that the people of  Buckingham had been disenf ranchised at the election, but that the parliamentary
Conservative Party had subsequently declared the justif ication f or limiting their electoral choice to be
irrelevant.
All of  this is to say that, f or the duration of  a Speaker ’s term in of f ice, normal democracy is ef f ectively
suspended in the constituency they represent. This is also the case in Parliament. As a Speaker is unable to
display any outward bias, he or she must not advocate or question any policy emanating f rom the
Government. If , f or example, the Government was to propose the construction of  a new airport in the
middle of  leaf y Buckingham, their Parliamentary representative would be constitutionally unable to raise the
issue with the Secretary of  State on the f loor of  the House of  Commons, or in a written question. To do so
would be a breach of  protocol. While the Speaker is able to continue processing casework on behalf  of  his
constituents, he is unable to of f er the f ull range of  Parliamentary ‘services’ to his constituents available to
any other MP.
Potential solutions
We have considered several options f or how the UK may address these issues, and ensure the Speaker ’s
constituents are not excluded f rom democracy.  A number of  broad approaches might be considered, based
on the processes f or electing the presiding of f icers in other legislatures, although some would entail more
radical change than could probably be countenanced by MPs.
Resignation of parliamentary seat
One option may be to transf orm the of f ice of  Speaker, so it is no longer carried out alongside the duties of
a regular MP. In this scenario, Speakers would resign their parliamentary seat once selected f or the post,
but remain in Parliament with a special status. They could perhaps be given a token posit ion such as MP f or
the Palace of  Westminster, if  the weight of  parliamentary tradit ion proves too hard to cast of f . The
constituency would then elect a regular MP to replace the new Speaker. The main potential drawback of  this
approach would be that the appointment would likely trigger a by-election very soon af ter a general election
– although it is possible this could be delayed, with a new Speaker allowed to continue to represent his/her
constituency f or a f ixed period or until the next general election.
Multi-member constituencies
Ireland appears the most similar to the UK in terms of  how it elects the Ceann Comhairle, or chairman, of
the Irish Parliament’s lower house. Like the Commons Speaker, the Ceann Comhairle observes strict
polit ical neutrality in parliament, and the Irish Constitution states that the post-holder is automatically re-
elected to his/her constituency at a general election – in the UK, re-election is not automatic but is
ef f ectively guaranteed by convention. The key dif f erence is that Irish parliamentary constituencies elect
between three and f ive representatives under the single transf errable vote system: this means that voters
in the constituency of  the Ceann Comhairle have less choice than other voters, but are not preventing f rom
af f ecting the result of  the election. Of  course, f ull-scale electoral ref orm is no longer on the UK polit ical
agenda f ollowing the f ailure of  the Alternative Vote ref erendum. It is conceivable, however, that a Speaker ’s
constituency could be transf ormed into a dual-member constituency f or the period he/she is in of f ice, with
the main parties each proposing one candidate at a general election.
Direct election
The most radical option would be f or the country to directly elect the House of  Commons Speaker. This
method was previously used to choose the presiding of f icer of  the powerf ul New York City Council, where
until 2002 the directly-elected Public Advocate acted as presiding of f icer as well as
perf orming other ombudsman-like duties on behalf  of  the public. Of  course, establishing a directly-elected
national of f ice might present a challenge to the legit imacy of  the indirectly-elected UK government and
Prime Minister. In New York this could be avoided because the city has a directly-elected Mayor. Again,
Ireland again provides an example of  how the system might work – the country combines a parliamentary
system of  government with a directly-elected President, an of f ice with strictly limited powers.
Allowing party membership
Other Westminster-style legislatures replicate the impartiality of  the presiding of f icer role we see in the
Commons, but without the requirement or expectation that the of f ice-holder will renounce their polit ical
party links. The speakers of  the lower houses in Canada, Australia and New Zealand stand as candidates
f or their respective parties at a general election, and are opposed by other parties as in any other
constituency. Should the sitt ing speaker lose his/her seat, legislators simply choose another f rom their
number as a successor.  The United States Congress (not a Westminster-style legislature) goes much
f urther. The Speaker of  the US House of  Representatives is a partisan role, and its holder is ef f ectively the
leader of  his or her party – the Speaker and any deputies he or she appoints will of ten use the powers
af f orded the post f or polit ical gain.
Closer to home,  we can f ind examples of  presiding of f icers retaining their polit ical party membership.  In
the Welsh Assembly the Presiding Of f icer stands in elections as party members, opposed by other parties:
the f irst of f ice-holder, Daf ydd Elis-Thomas, did so in 2003, 2007 and 2011. Experience in the Scottish
Parliament has been slightly dif f erent: to date each Presiding Of f icer has voluntarily stood down f rom their
party, and none has so f ar sought to be re-elected as an independent.
In f act, the House of  Commons has three Deputy Speakers that all retain their polit ical allegiances: unlike
the Speaker, they are not restricted f rom local polit ical campaigning, and there is no convention which
prevents the three main polit ical parties standing against them. Michael Lord was Deputy Speaker f rom 1997
to 2010, f or instance, but stood as a Conservative in the 2001 and 2005 elections. A quick look at
the three current Deputy Speakers’ websites shows they make litt le attempt to disguise their party identity,
despite the retention of  studious neutrality while carrying out their parliamentary duties.
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